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Targeted, Direct-Mail Solicitation: Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Association Under Attack
Jeffrey S. Kinsler*
Dear Ms. Smith:
It is our understanding that you were injured in the recent
South Shore train accident. You have the right to fair compensation for all accident and injury-related costs, including loss of
earnings and damages for pain and suffering. Every insurance
company has experienced lawyers and claims adjusters on its
payroll to protect [its] interest[s]. . . . We would like to make
certain that you are treated fairly. If you have not yet hired an
attorney, we invite you to give us a call.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of the public exhibits an alarming ignorance about
the law and its impact on their lives. 2 People avoid consulting a
lawyer even when they perceive a need to do so.3 This tendency stems
*

Visiting Professor of Law, Valparaiso University; Associate, Mayer, Brown &

Platt, Chicago, Illinois; Member of the Illinois Bar. B.S., Ball State University 1985;
J.D., Valparaiso University 1989; L.L.M. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1994.
1. On January 18, 1993, two South Shore & South Bend Railroad ("South Shore")
trains collided head-on in Gary, Indiana, killing seven and injuring dozens more.
Although Ms. Smith is a fictitious person, the letter is authentic. A Lake County,
Indiana law firm sent this letter on January 19, 1993-the day after the collision-to at
least one of the persons purportedly injured in the accident. On that same day, another
law firm ran the following advertisement in a local paper:
South Shore Accident Victims
KNOW YOUR RIGHTS
We had an investigator at the scene collecting evidence. Call for a FREE injury booklet and FREE consultation.
See South Shore Accident Victims, GARY POST TRIB., Jan. 19, 1993, at C3.
2. See Legal Advertising: The Illinois Experiment, 1985 A.B.A. COMM'N ON
ADVERTISING 1 [hereinafter Illinois Experiment]. Various studies and surveys suggest
that many Americans are generally ignorant of fundamental principles of the American
legal system, such as which party bears the burden of proof in a criminal trial. Id.
Additionally, many Americans do not understand the fundamental roles assumed by
lawyers and are frequently unaware that in certain matters the assistance of an attorney
may be necessary. Id.
3. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 370 nn.22-23 (1977) (citing various
surveys and studies suggesting that members of American society are generally unaware
of where and how to obtain competent legal services and often fear that services will not
be affordable).
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largely from two factors: the feared price of the attorney's services
and an inability to locate competent counsel.4 As the letter reprinted
above demonstrates, targeted, direct-mail solicitation is one means of
increasing the general public's access to legal services. 5
Attorneys have been reluctant to take part in advertising and solicitation' since the United States Supreme Court specifically allowed their
use sixteen years ago.7 Of those attorneys who have advertised or
solicited, most have used the traditional forms of advertising such as
television, radio, and print media. Attorneys have been particularly
averse to direct-mail solicitation, which may be the most effective form
of advertisement. 8
Prior to 1988, the scarcity of attorney solicitation could be explained
by the unsettled nature of the governing law. In that year, however,
the Supreme Court finally clarified the law regarding targeted, directmail solicitation by attorneys, or so it appeared. In Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 9 the Supreme Court held that a state may not
"categorically prohibit" targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyers.'l
The Court emphasized that the relevant inquiry to determine the propriety of a particular direct-mail solicitation "is not whether there exist
potential clients whose 'condition' makes them susceptible to undue
influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious
danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility."' ' Most
lawyers and judges have correctly interpreted Shapero as holding that

4. Id.
5. See Nomi N. Zomick, Note, Attorney Solicitation of Clients: Proposed Solutions,
7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755 (1979), for a discussion of the effect of targeted, direct-mail solicitation.
6. Report on the Survey on the Image of Lawyers in Advertising, 1990 A.B.A.
COMM'N ON ADVERTISING 2-3 (noting that only 32% of attorneys responding to a

November 1987 A.B.A. survey reported that they had used advertising).
7. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. For a detailed discussion of Bates, see infra notes 36-55
and accompanying text.
8. See Illinois Experiment, supra note 2, at 34, reporting that:
The likelihood that an individual attorney's advertising campaign is effective can be increased if he or she adheres to the following suggestions: direct
an ad to a specific target audience-tailor the content of the ad, the choice of
medium, and how a medium is used; address a meaningful, unmet need of the
target audience; focus on one key message rather than attempting to convey
two or three messages; test to see that the ad actually communicates the intended message, and also that it creates positive reaction to that message.
Id.
9. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
10. Id. at 471.
11. Id. at 474.
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the First Amendment 2 protects
written modes of solicitation that are
3
misleading.'
nor
false
neither
The lawyer who sent the letter reprinted above probably relied upon
Shapero when concluding that it was both legal and ethical to send the
letter to persons injured in the South Shore train collision. Such a
conclusion reflects an entirely reasonable reading of Shapero. This
lawyer-and probably most other lawyers, judges, and scholarswould be surprised to learn that despite the Supreme Court's holding
in Shapero, some states still discipline attorneys for sending truthful,
targeted, direct-mail solicitations. If the South Shore letter had been
sent in New Jersey, Florida, Alabama, or Texas, this lawyer might be
facing a reprimand, suspension,14 or even incarceration.15
Over the last two years, state courts have begun to erode the constitutional protection afforded targeted, direct-mail solicitation in
Shapero. In particular, three state supreme courts have held that targeted, direct-mail solicitation of victims or their families immediately
after an accident does not deserve First Amendment protection.16 In
their zeal to punish what they perceive as distasteful conduct, these
12. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939).
13. See, e.g., Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n, 545 A.2d 685, 691
(Md. 1988); Robert D. Peltz, Legal Advertising-Opening Pandora'sBox?, 19 STETSON
L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1989).
14. See infra note 16.
15. In June, the Texas legislature passed a law making certain types of solicitation by
attorneys a felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. Mark
Hansen, Texas Makes Solicitation a Felony, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 32. See infra
note 167 for a more thorough discussion of the Texas legislation.
16. See Norris v. Alabama State Bar, 582 So. 2d 1034, 1036-37 (Ala. 1991) (holding
that the attorney's act of sending flowers, a letter offering his firm's services, and his
law firm's brochure to the funeral home where ceremonies for an accident victim were to
take place constituted improper solicitation), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 417 (1991); The
Florida Bar: Petition to Amend Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues,
571 So. 2d 451, 459 (Fla. 1990) (upholding ban on sending direct-mail solicitations
pertaining to personal injury and wrongful death claims less than thirty days after the
accident or disaster); In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1271 (N.J. 1992) (holding that the
attorney's act of sending a direct-mail solicitation to the family of a Lockerbie airplane
crash victim one day after the victim's body had been identified violated New Jersey's
ban on soliciting legal representation at a time when the attorney knew or should have
known that the prospective client could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing
an attorney), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992).
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state courts have essentially ignored the plain meaning of Shapero and
have instead concluded that the vulnerability of certain potential clients
justifies a partial ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation.
Disturbingly, those who oppose granting First Amendment protection
to direct-mail solicitation are beginning to rely upon these cases for
precedent. 7 If this trend continues, the First Amendment protection
that the Shapero Court intended to grant to targeted, direct-mail solicitation by attorneys will vanish.
Section II of this Article explores the impact that the First
Amendment has had on the history of attorney advertising and solicitation, with particular emphasis on its impact on direct-mail solicitation.
Section III analyzes the state court decisions that have limited this First
Amendment protection. Finally, Section IV of this Article explains
why these state court decisions are inconsistent with Shapero and
therefore should not be followed.
II.

EVOLUTION OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION

For generations, lawyers in Britain and the United States were forbidden to publicize the availability of their services.' 8 Bans on client
solicitation by lawyers were based upon long-standing traditions and
beliefs, including "Greek law, Roman law, English common law, and
the widespread belief in medieval society that law suits are inherently
evil."' 9 In England, for example, the legal community banned attorney
advertising and solicitation of clients to protect the public from such
abuses as barratry, champerty, and maintenance.2"
17. See, e.g., McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1547-48 (M.D. Fla. 1992)
(noting that the Florida Bar relied upon In re Anis when defending its thirty day ban on
targeted, direct-mail solicitation in personal injury and wrongful death cases).
1 8.

STEPHEN GILLERS & NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW

AND ETHICS 31 (1985). There were a few minor exceptions to the blanket ban on attorney advertising. A lawyer could buy space in approved directories, such as MartindaleHubbell Law Directory, purchase a line in local telephone books, or register with a bar
association referral service. Id.
19. Zomick, supra note 5, at 757 (citations omitted).
20. Victoria J. Kratzer, Comment, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association: First
Amendment Protection for "Targeted" Advertisements by Attorneys, 23 GA. L. REV.
545, 547 (1989). Blackstone defined "barratry" as "the offence of frequently exciting
and stirring up suits and quarrels." See State v. Batson, 17 S.E.2d 511, 512 (N.C. 1941)
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 134). "Champerty ...consists of an
agreement under which a person who has no interest in the suit of another undertakes to
maintain or support it at his own expense in exchange for part of the litigated matter in
the event of a successful conclusion of the cause." Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co.,
525 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). "Maintenance" consists of "an officious
intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it." Id. (quoting Moffett v.
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The English prohibition on attorney advertising and solicitation did
not initially take hold in this country. In the nineteenth century, advertising by American attorneys was commonplace. Abraham Lincoln,
for example, used advertising and direct-mail solicitation to acquire
clients during the 1850s. 2 ' Despite the use of advertising and directmail solicitation by an attorney such as Lincoln, well known for his
high standards of professional ethics,22 the ABA adopted the first
prohibition on attorney advertising in 1908.23 Canon 27 provided:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations.
Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation,
offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and
are reprehensible; but the customary use of simple professional
cards is not improper.24
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1969,
continued the virtual ban on attorney advertising and solicitation.25
Commerce Trust Co., 283 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Mo. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996
(1956)).
21. See Robert F. Boden, Five Years After Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and
Ethical Perspective, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 548 (1982). The author notes that in the
months preceding the litigation in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. County of McLean, 17 I11.291
(1855), Lincoln solicited professional employment from both parties by mail and was
subsequently retained by the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Id.
22. See Boden, supra note 21, at 547.
23. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908).
24. Id. The ABA enacted Canon 27 "to reverse a perceived deterioration in the standards of the American bar resulting from widespread belief, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 'that professions were undemocratic and un-American."' Kratzer, supra
note 20, at 548 n.15 (quoting John Ratino, Note, In re R.M.J.: Reassessing the
Extension of First Amendment Protection to Attorney Advertising, 32 CATH. U. L. REV.
729, 733-34 (1983)).
25. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101, -103, -104 (1976)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]. As amended in 1976, section 2-101(B) of the Model Code
provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial
publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Id. at DR 2-101(B). Similarly, section 2-103(A) provided:
A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of
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Additionally, until the mid-1970s the Supreme Court's position that
the First Amendment protected only political speech and not commercial speech tacitly supported the prohibitions on attorney advertising
and solicitation that many states had enacted.26 A shift in the standards
governing attorney advertising did not begin until the mid-1970s,
when the Supreme Court first held that commercial speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection.27
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, a group of consumers
challenged a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs, arguing that the advertising prohibition violated the First Amendment.28 Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, observed that the Court was confronted with an issue
of first impression: Is purely commercial speech, such as a communication stating "'I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price,"'
protected by the First Amendment?29
In addressing this question, the Court noted that the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information is "as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate. 30 Moreover, the Court found that society as a whole
has a strong interest in protecting commercial speech because
commercial speech may assist consumers by furthering their interest in
himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.
Id. at DR 2-103(A). Finally, section 2-104(A) provided that, subject to three exceptions:
A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain
counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that
advice ....
Id. at DR 2-104(A).
26. Kratzer, supra note 20, at 549.
27. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
28. Id. at 749-50.
29. Id. at 760-761. The Court noted a number of decisions in which it had previously
touched on this issue. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822, 825 (1975)
(reversing a conviction for violation of statute that made the circulation of any publication to encourage or promote the procuring of an abortion illegal); Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 387 (1973) (upholding
an ordinance prohibiting newspapers from listing employment advertisements according to gender because such advertisements are merely commercial speech and thus are not
entitled to First Amendment protection); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45
(1951) (upholding conviction for violation of ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55
(1942) (upholding New York statute prohibiting the distribution of handbills, circulars
and other advertising matter on streets).
30. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763.
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the fullest possible dissemination of commercial information. 3' These
interests, along with the acknowledgment that "[a]dvertising, however
tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information,"32 led the Court to conclude that purely
commercial speech is indeed entitled to First Amendment protection.33
Accordingly, the Supreme Court narrowly defined the category of
constitutionally permissible restrictions on commercial speech: only
commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern
unlawful activities may be restricted in the service of a substantial government interest, and then only through means that directly advance
that interest. 34 Furthermore, rules prohibiting commercial speech will
not be upheld if the government's interest in suppressing the speech
can be advanced by a more limited regulation. 5
A. Attorney Advertising and In-Person Solicitation

Only one year after its decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,
the Supreme Court encountered a commercial speech dispute specifically addressing the issue of attorney advertising. In Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona,36 the Court invalidated an absolute prohibition on advertising by lawyers and held that lawyer advertising is a form of
commercial speech that may not be subjected to blanket suppression.37
In Bates, two lawyers advertised their services and fees in a daily
newspaper in violation of an Arizona disciplinary rule prohibiting

3 1. Id. at 764. In emphasizing the strong societal interest in the free flow of
commercial information and the necessity of protecting commercial information, the
Court further observed:
"Even an individual advertisement, though entirely
'commercial,' may be of general public interest . . . .To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable." Id. at 764-65.
32. Id. at 765.
33. Id. at 770, 773. Although the Court made clear that its opinion was limited to
commercial advertising by pharmacists, Id. at 773 n.25, its decision in Virginia State
Bd. provided the foundation for its opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
363-65 (1977), discussed infra section II.A., in which the Court overturned a blanket
prohibition on advertising by attorneys. See also Peltz, supra note 13, at 48.
34. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (holding that the State's absolute ban
on promotional advertising by electric utility companies violates the First
Amendment).
35. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
36. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
37. Id. at 383. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, specifically held that the
advertising of fees charged for routine legal services was not inherently misleading and
thus could not be flatly prohibited as long as the attorney performs the services at the
advertised price. Id. at 372-73.
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attorney advertising.38 Following a complaint, a hearing was held before the Special Administrative Committee of the Arizona State Bar
Association. 39 The State Bar's Board of Governors reviewed the
committee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommendedn°
that each lawyer be suspended from the practice of law for one week.
Prior to the imposition of the sanction and pursuant to Arizona
Supreme Court Rule 36(d), the matter was transferred to the Supreme
Court of Arizona. 4' The Arizona Supreme Court reduced the sanction
to a censure only.42
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the lawyers argued
that their advertisements were protected commercial speech and that
Arizona's blanket prohibition on attorney advertising violated their
First Amendment rights. 43 The State Bar of Arizona advanced a number of justifications for the prohibition. 44 The Supreme Court
considered and rejected each argument in turn. 45 The State Bar
claimed, for example, that advertising would have an adverse effect on
professionalism,46 in part by commercializing the practice of law and
thereby undermining the dignity of the profession. In rejecting this
argument, the Court observed that the ban on advertising originated as
38. Id. at 354-55. The Arizona rule governing attorney advertising provided in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial
publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Id. at 355 (quoting ARIZ. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1976)).
39. In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 641-42 (Ariz. 1976).
40. Id. at 642.
41. Id.
42. Id.The Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that although the attorneys deliberately
violated the Arizona disciplinary rules, they did so "in good faith as an earnest challenge
to the validity of DR 2-101(B)." Id. at 646. The United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction, and an appeal was taken. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 429 U.S.
813 (1976).
43. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977).
44. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-79. The State Bar argued that the ban was justified because
attorney advertising: (I) adversely affected professionalism; (2) is inherently misleading in nature; (3) would tend to stir up litigation; (4) would ultimately lead to an increase
in attorneys' fees; (5) adversely affected the quality of legal services; and (6) is too
difficult to regulate with anything other than a complete ban. Id.
45. Id.at 379.
46. Id. at 368-72.
47. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368. The Court summarized the State Bar's argument: "The key
to professionalism, it is argued, is the sense of pride that involvement in the discipline
generates. It is claimed that price advertising will bring about commercialization,
which will undermine the attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth." Id.
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a rule of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics, 8 and it concluded that
etiquette must give way to First Amendment guarantees of free
speech. 49 The State Bar also argued that the alternatives to a wholesale
restriction on attorney advertising caused problems of enforcement."
Due to the number of lawyers, the public's lack of sophistication with
regard to legal matters, and the potential for overreaching inherent in
the system, the State Bar claimed that overseeing attorney advertising
would be burdensome.5 The Court rejected this argument as well,
noting:
It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at
one point, and, at another, to assert that its members will seize
the opportunity to mislead and distort. We suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will behave as they always have: They
will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and
honor of their profession and of the legal system.52

Accordingly, the Court held that attorney advertising is protected
commercial speech and may not be subjected to a blanket
suppression.5 ' However, the Court declined to rule that attorney advertising may not be constitutionally regulated in any way.54 The court
held that certain restrictions on attorney advertising, such as those
prohibiting false, deceptive, or misleading advertising, are
constitutionally permissible.
48. Id. at 371.
49. Id. at 379.
50. Id.
5 1. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379. The State Bar claimed that "[a]fter-the-fact action by the
consumer lured by such advertising may not provide a realistic restraint because of the
inability of the layman to assess whether the service he has received meets professional
standards." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 383. Justice Powell, however, writing for the dissent, argued that the advertising of "routine" legal services is vastly different from price advertising of a standardized product such as the prescription drugs in Virginia State Bd. Id. at 390-91 (Powell,
J.,dissenting). According to Justice Powell, the advertising of professional services
involves an increased potential for deception and an enhanced difficulty of effective regulation. Bates, 433 U.S. at 394, 395-97 (Powell, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice
Powell opined that neither the First Amendment nor the public interest justified protecting attorney advertising. Id. at 389 (Powell, J.,dissenting).
54. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
55. Id. For example, the Court noted that advertisements concerning the quality of a
lawyer's services are so likely to be misleading that they may warrant restriction. Id. at
383-84. Likewise, the Court noted that similar objections might justify restraints on
in-person solicitation. Id. at 384. As with other varieties of speech, the Court held that
reasonable restrictions may be placed on the time, place and manner of attorney advertising. Id. The Court also noted that "some limited supplementation, by way of warning
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During the following term, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n5 6 and
In re Primus, 57 the Court defined with more particularity the scope of
constitutionally permissible restrictions on attorney advertising. In
Ohralik,an Ohio attorney solicited professional employment from two
young women shortly after they had been injured in an automobile
accident.58 After the women protested to a local bar association, the
Ohio State Bar Association filed a formal complaint with the disciplinary committee of the Ohio Supreme Court.5 9 The disciplinary
committee determined that the attorney, Ohralik, had violated two Ohio
disciplinary rules' and rejected his defense that his conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. 6 The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the committee's
findings and indefinitely suspended Ohralik's license to practice law.62
Before the United States Supreme Court, Ohralik contended that his
in-person solicitation of two women was indistinguishable, for the
purposes of constitutional analysis, from the constitutionally
permissible advertisements in Bates.63 The Court disagreed, noting
that in-person solicitation poses unique dangers because it encourages
speedy and uninformed decision-making by placing more immediate
pressure upon the potential client.' Recognizing that states may have
important interests in preventing possible "overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation" that may occur when
a client is personally solicited, the Court reasoned that in-person solicitation creates potential for attorney misconduct and may be subjected to

or disclaimer or the like, might be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled
upon today so as to assure that the consumer is not misled." Id.
56. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
57. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
58. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449-54. Ohralik solicited one victim while she lay in
traction in the hospital. Id. at 450. He then used the information that he had received
from the first victim to solicit the second victim at her home on the day she was released
from the hospital. Id. at 451.
59. Id. at 452-53.
60. Id. at 453.
61. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453.
62. Id. at 453-54. The committee had only recommended that Ohralik be subject to a
public reprimand. Id. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, and
an appeal was taken. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
63. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455. The Court noted that Ohralik did not bring a facial
challenge to the Ohio disciplinary rules at issue, but simply argued that their use to
discipline him violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 462 n.20.
64. Id. at 457. The Court also noted that the legal community has long regarded inperson solicitation of business as unprofessional and potentially harmful to the client.
Id. at 454.
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a blanket prohibition.65
The Court also noted that unlike the advertisement in Bates, in-person solicitation is not visible to regulators, and thus is not subject to
public scrutiny. 66 Accordingly, short of a complete ban on in-person
solicitation, the difficulty of obtaining reliable proof of an attorney's
misconduct would render in-person solicitation "virtually immune"
from state disciplinary action. 67 Thus, because the Court found that
Ohio had a sufficient interest to discipline attorneys for the type of
conduct in which Ohralik had engaged, the Court held that the Ohio
State Bar did not violate Ohralik's constitutional rights by enforcing its
ban on in-person solicitation.68
On the same day that it decided Ohralik, the Supreme Court reversed
a South Carolina Supreme Court decision that had enforced state
disciplinary rules against an attorney for offering her legal services to a
potential client.69 In In re Primus, a lawyer cooperating with the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") sent a letter to a woman
who had been sterilized as a condition of receiving public assistance,
informing the woman that the ACLU would represent her pro bono in
a lawsuit against the doctor who had performed the sterilization."' The
South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the lawyer, Primus, by
sending the letter to a prospective client, had violated the state's
disciplinary rules7 and should be publicly reprimanded. 72 In reversing this decision, the United States Supreme Court held that solicita65. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461-64. The Court explained that "[t]he detrimental aspects
of face-to-face selling ... of ordinary consumer products have been recognized ... and it
hardly need be said that the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person." Id. at 464-65.
66. Id. at 466.
67. Id. The Court noted that evidentiary difficulties in proving a case against an
attorney would be particularly difficult "if the layperson were so distressed at the time of
the solicitation that he could not recall specific details at a later date." Id.
Since Ohralik, the Court has held that states may not place absolute bans on in-person
solicitation by certain professionals other than attorneys. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane,
113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798, 1802 (1993) (holding that Florida's absolute ban on in-person
solicitation by accountants is inconsistent with the free speech guarantees of the First
Amendment).
68. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467-68.
69. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 416-19, 439 (1978).
70. Id. at 415-16.
7 1. The relevant South Carolina disciplinary rule provided in pertinent part that "[a]
lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or
take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice." In re Primus,
436 U.S. at 418 n. 1I(quoting S.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A)).
72. Primus, 436 U.S. at 421.
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tion by or for a non-profit organization such as the ACLU was a form
of political expression entitled to the highest form of First Amendment
protection.73
Finding that the nature of the state's interest at issue in Primus was
different than that in Ohralik, the Court distinguished the latter case.
The Court observed that unlike the political speech at issue in Primus,
the communication in Ohralik involved in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain and under circumstances likely to harm the client.74
The Court also emphasized that in Primus, the solicitation had been
conducted by letter, rather than by face-to-face solicitation, as in
Ohralik."
During the 1980's, the Supreme Court continued to narrow the category of permissible restrictions on attorney advertising. In In re
R.M.J.,76 the Court struck down a Missouri rule77 that prohibited
attorneys from mailing professional announcement cards to anyone
other than lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives. 78 The lawyer in R.M.J. had mailed cards announcing the opening of his new office to people who were not within the rule's
permissible group of recipients.79 In holding that the rule violated the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that Missouri had
failed to show that there were no less restrictive means of regulating
general mailings by attorneys, such as requiring the filing of a copy of
all general mailings with the state bar. 80
Four years later in Zaudererv. Office of DisciplinaryCouncil of the

73. Id. at 428-31. The Court relied heavily upon its earlier opinion in NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963) (holding that the First Amendment protected a
lawyer's solicitation of clients on behalf of the NAACP).
74. Primus, 436 U.S. at 434-36.
75. Id. at 435-36. The Ohralik court reasoned:
The transmittal of this letter-as contrasted with in-person solicitation-involved no appreciable invasion of privacy; nor did it afford any significant
opportunity for overreaching or coercion. Moreover, the fact that there was a
written communication lessens substantially the difficulty of policing solicitation practices that do offend valid rules of professional conduct.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
76. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
77.

MO. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 2-102(A)(2) (1978).

78. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206-07. The lawyer additionally challenged the constitutionality of another Missouri rule restricting lawyer advertising to certain categories of
information and, in some instances, to certain specified language. Id. at 194-95. The
Supreme Court also found this rule to be an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.
Id. at 205-206.
79. Id. at 198.
80. Id. at 206.
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Supreme Court of Ohio,8" the Supreme Court again held that a state's
disciplinary rules placing limitations on attorney advertising unconstitutionally restricted attorneys' free speech rights.82 Zauderer was an
attorney whom the Ohio Supreme Court had publicly reprimanded for
running a newspaper advertisement publicizing his willingness to represent women who had suffered injuries resulting from their use of a
contraceptive known as the Dalkon Shield.83 The advertisement
featured an illustration of the Dalkon Shield and stated that Zauderer's
law firm was handling lawsuits against the Dalkon Shield's
manufacturer on a contingent-fee basis.8 4 The Office of Disciplinary
Counsel filed a complaint against Zauderer, alleging, inter alia, that the
attorney violated Ohio's disciplinary rules which:85 (1) prohibited the
use of illustrations in advertisements; (2) prohibited lawyers from
accepting employment from persons to whom they have furnished unsolicited legal advice; and (3) prohibited false and deceptive statements
in legal advertisements. 86
The Supreme Court held that the application of these rules to
Zauderer's Dalkon Shield advertisement violated Zauderer's First
Amendment rights because the State did not have any substantial interest in prohibiting truthful advertising. 87 The Court declined to rely on
its reasoning in Ohralik, emphasizing that whereas in-person solicitation, such as in Ohralik, is "rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright
fraud, '' 88 print advertising, such as in Zauderer, does not pose as
significant a threat to the consumer.8 9 Accordingly, the court concluded that "[a]n attorney may not be disciplined for soliciting legal
81. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
82. Id. at 639-49.
83. Id. at 629-36. The attorney also was disciplined for running a newspaper advertisement advising readers that his firm would represent defendants in drunk driving cases
and that his clients' full legal fees would be refunded if they were convicted of drunk driving. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio found this advertisement to be deceptive and
publicly reprimanded the attorney. Id. at 635-36, 655. The United States Supreme Court
upheld this portion of the judgment. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 655-56.
84. Id. at 630-31. According to Zauderer's advertisement, "[i]f there is no recovery,
no legal fees are owed by our clients." Id. at 631. The advertisement also stated that the
Dalkon Shield had generated many lawsuits; that the lawyer's firm was willing to represent other women asserting similar claims; and that readers should not assume their
claims were time-barred. Id. The Court found each of these statements to be truthful, and
thus protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 645.
85. Zauderer,471 U.S. at 631-33.
86. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (A)-(B), 2-104(A) (1982).

87. Zauderer, 471
88. Id. at 641.
89. Id. at 642.

U.S. at 639-49.
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business through printed advertising containing truthful and
nondeceptive information and advice regarding the legal rights of
potential clients. ' 9°
Collectively, the Supreme Court's decisions in Bates, Ohralik,
Primus,R.M.J., and Zauderer make it clear that states cannot place
blanket prohibitions on the following types of advertising by attorneys:
advertising the costs of certain routine legal services in the print media;
advertising an accurate listing of the attorney's areas of practice, either
through general mailings, announcements to specific targeted groups,
newspaper ads, or telephone listings; advising target portions of the
public of their rights to pursue particular types of cases; and directly
soliciting prospective clients, either by mail or in-person, where the
attorney is motivated by the desire to promote political and ideological
goals, rather than for purely pecuniary gain. 9 These decisions do
allow states to ban in-person solicitation, however, when the attorney
is motivated solely by pecuniary gain.92
B. Targeted, Direct-MailSolicitationBefore Shapero
These Supreme Court decisions laid the groundwork for extending
First Amendment protection to targeted, direct-mail solicitation by
attorneys. Specifically, in Primus,the Court emphasized that the form
of solicitation was by letter, which, in contrast to in-person solicitation, "involved no appreciable invasion of privacy; nor did it afford
any significant opportunity for overreaching or coercion. ' 0 3 The Court
further pointed out that "the fact that there was a written communication lessens substantially the difficulty of policing solicitation
practices" because such communications offer more reliable proof of
possible attorney misconduct than does in-person solicitation. 94
In R.M.J., the Court extended First Amendment protection of attorney solicitation by mail, striking down a state statute that prohibited
lawyers from sending any professional announcement cards, even
those that were not misleading, to the general public. 95 These
decisions, however, left unresolved a significant issue in the arena of
90. Id. at 647.
91. See Peltz, supra note 13, at 44; see also, Peel v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) (holding that states may not ban a
lawyer from advertising his or her certification as a trial specialist by a nationally
recognized organization, but that states may require that warnings or disclaimers
accompany such advertising).
92. See Peltz, supra note 13, at 44-45.
93. Primus, 436 U.S. at 435 (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 435-36; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-67.
95. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206-07.
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attorney direct-mail solicitation: whether the First Amendment protects
direct-mail solicitation of clients known to have a particular legal
problem.96 The Supreme Court did not answer this important question
until it rendered its opinion in Shapero in 1988.
Prior to Shapero, state and lower federal courts were split on
whether targeted, direct-mail solicitation should receive First
Amendment protection. A number of courts had held that the First
Amendment protects the right of attorneys to send targeted, direct-mail
solicitation to persons known to be in need of legal services in
connection with the sale of real estate. For example, in Koffler v.
Joint Bar Ass'n,9 7 the Court of Appeals of New York held that New
York's ban on direct-mail solicitation, as applied to an attorney who
had sent letters to 7,500 individual property owners98 offering his
services in connection with the sale of their real estate, violated the
First Amendment.99
In holding that the type of solicitation in which Koffler had engaged
did not justify a complete ban, the court found that Koffler's solicitation activities did not have the potential for invasion of privacy and
overreaching that might be present, for example, in telephone solicitation.' 0° The Court thus distinguished the intrusiveness inherently present in other types of solicitation from the relatively non-intrusive
nature of Koffler's direct-mail solicitation, noting:
[A] recipient of a lawyer's letter "may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring . . . [it] from envelope
to wastebasket." It is not enough to justify a ban that in some
situations (marital discord, a death in the family) a solicitation
letter may be offensive to the recipient, or that some people may
fear receiving a lawyer's letter, or to suggest that there may be
some who by reason of frequent receipt of lawyers' solicitation
01
letters may discard without opening a mailed summons.
Likewise, in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart,'°2 the Supreme Court
96. See Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 801 F.2d 968,
973 (7th Cir. 1986).
97. 412 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
98. The attorney also sent letters to a number of real estate brokers asking the brokers to refer clients to him in connection with the purchase or sale of real estate.
Koffler, 412 N.E.2d at 929.
99. Id. at 929, 934. The Court noted that Koffler could not raise a facial overbreadth
challenge to the New York ban because overbreadth analysis does not apply to commercial speech. Id. at 930; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462 n.20.
100. Koffler, 412 N.E.2d at 933.
101. Id. at 933 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 542 (1980)).
102. 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
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of Kentucky extended First Amendment protection to targeted directmail solicitation by attorneys in connection with the sale of real
estate. 10 3 The lawyers in Stuart sent letters to two real estate agencies
listing the prices that they charged for routine legal services.'0 4 The
Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that such letters are a form of advertisement and do not constitute in-person solicitation.'0 5 In holding
that the letters were advertisements and that the State had not demonstrated sufficient justification for its ban, the court noted that "[n]one
of the evils are present here which exist in the case of 'in-person solicitation.' There is not even the danger of exertion of pressure or
demands to encourage a person to make a speedy and possibly uninformed decision
whether to seek an attorney's assistance with a
10 6
problem."'

Similarly, in Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Comm'n,'0 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a federal district court order enjoining the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission from enforcing a disciplinary rule 10 8 forbidding targeted, direct-mail solicitation by attor103. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d at 934.
104. Id. at 933.
105. Id. at 933-34.
106. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d at 934. In an effort to distinguish direct-mail solicitation
from newspaper advertising, the Kentucky Bar Association argued that "by permitting
private mailings two evils may result which do not exist in the case of newspaper advertisement . . . . First, there is greater potential for over-reaching and deceptive practices
by unscrupulous attorneys. Second, enforcement of ethical standards of attorney advertising will become difficult, if not impossible... Id. Rejecting these arguments, the
court reasoned that because letters are in a written form, there is a record to protect
against such abuses. Id. See also Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 470 A.2d 235, 239
(Conn. 1984) (concluding that "blanket prohibition of mailed solicitations to third
parties violates the free speech provisions of the United States Constitution and the
Connecticut Constitution").
107. 801 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1986).
108. ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103 (1984) (amended 1987),
which provided in pertinent part:
(b) A lawyer may initiate contact with a prospective client in the following
circumstances:
(2) by written communication distributed generally to persons not known in a
specific matter to require such legal services as the lawyer offers to provide but
who in general might find such services to be useful and providing that such
letters and circulars and the envelopes containing them are plainly labeled as
advertising material.
Id. Illinois repealed this rule in 1990. Rule 7.3, which replaced DR 2-103, provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in Rule 7.3(b), a lawyer may initiate contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of solicitation in the following circum-

1993]

Targeted, Direct-Mail Solicitation

neys.' 0 9 Adams and other attorneys specializing in bankruptcy law
sent direct mailings to individuals whom they knew had debt
problems.1 0 The court found that the state's concerns in protecting
consumers from harassment, overreaching, and duress are less pressing with targeted mailings than with in-person solicitation."' In contrasting the duress that in-person solicitation can create with the relative
non-intrusive nature of direct mailings, the court noted that "[iut is
easier to throw out unwanted mail than an uninvited guest," and that
letters do not
"'involve pressure on the potential client for a yes-or-no
1 12
answer."'
State and lower federal courts did not limit First Amendment protection of targeted, direct-mail solicitation to that of attorneys offering real
estate and bankruptcy services. In In re Von Wiegen, 1 3 the New
York Court of Appeals reversed an order disciplining an attorney for
mailing solicitation letters to the victims and families of the 250 persons injured when the sky-walk collapsed at the Hyatt Regency Hotel
in Kansas City." 4 The Committee on Professional Standards argued
in part that a complete ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation in personal injury cases was warranted because accident victims are
especially susceptible to pressure from attorneys." 5 The court
reasoned, however, that the relevant issue is not whether certain types
stances:
(2) by letters or advertising circulars, providing that such letters and circulars
and the envelopes containing them are plainly labeled as advertising material.
ILL. COMP. STAT. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, RPC 7.3 (1993)
(amended 1990).
The exceptions listed in Rule 7.3(b) prohibit an attorney from soliciting clients
where: (1)the lawyer reasonably should know that the person's physical or mental state
makes it unlikely that they could exercise reasonable judgment; (2) the lawyer knows
that the person does not wish to receive the communication; or (3) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment. ILL. COMP. STAT. Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct RPC 7.3 (1993) (amended 1990).
109. Adams, 801 F.2d at 974-75.
110. Id. at 969, The potential clients targeted, for example, were people who had
been named as defendants in mortgage foreclosure and garnishment proceedings, and
persons against whom tax liens had been filed. Id. at 969-70.
111. Id. at973.
112. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642
(1985)). The court found that printed mailings are also easier to police than in-person
solicitation, and that although printed mailings may not be prohibited outright, more
narrow methods of regulating direct-mail solicitation, such as requiring that copies of
direct mailings be filed with the ARDC, are permissible. Adams, 801 F.2d at 974.
113. 470 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985).
114. Von Wiegen, 470 N.E.2d at 839, 845.
115. Id. at 844.
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of potential clients, such as accident victims or their families, are susceptible to undue influence, but "whether a particular method of advertising is inherently misleading." ' 1 6 Accordingly, the court concluded
that a state may not absolutely ban a method of solicitation if the
method allows information to be presented in a way that is not deceptive.' i7 In the Von Weigen court's view, since targeted, direct-mail
solicitation can be presented in a nondeceptive fashion, an absolute ban
on direct-mail solicitation is unconstitutional."'
Although these decisions demonstrate that a number of courts had
already extended First Amendment protection to targeted, direct-mail
solicitation before Shapero, many courts had reached the opposite
conclusion that direct-mail advertising was not entitled to constitutional
protection." 9 In Shapero the Supreme Court resolved this split of authority in favor of extending First Amendment protection to all targeted, direct-mail solicitation, provided the mailings are not false or
misleading.
C. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association

Richard Shapero petitioned the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising
Commission (the "Commission") for approval of a letter he proposed
to send to potential clients against whom foreclosure suits had been
116. Id. at 843; see also In re Discipline of Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204, 209, 215
(Minn. 1981) (upholding the right of an attorney to send direct-mail advertising that
was not misleading to victims in a products liability case, and rejecting the argument
that the type of case, such as complex tort litigation, may justify a ban on direct-mail
solicitation).
117. Von Weigen, 470 N.E.2d at 843.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., In re Frank, 440 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Ind. 1982) (upholding discipline of
attorney for soliciting by mail persons he knew had been charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol); State v. Moses, 642 P.2d 1004, 1005-07 (Kan. 1982) (upholding
discipline of attorney who sent letters to people whose names he had gathered from the
Realtors Multiple Listing Service, recommending that those people retain the attorney
to assist them with the sale of their homes); In re Alessi, 457 N.E.2d 682, 683-84 (N.Y.
1983) (upholding discipline imposed on an attorney for sending 1,000 realtors a letter
quoting fees for listed real estate transactions), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984);
Greene v. Grievance Comm. (In re Greene), 429 N.E.2d 390, 391, 395-96 (N.Y. 1981)
(holding that direct mailings sent to real estate brokers asking brokers to refer clients to
attorney transgresses law prohibiting attorney solicitation, and that the statute was
valid because (1) the State had a substantial interest in preventing conflicts of interest in
attorney-client relationships, and (2) there was no less-restrictive means that could
adequately redress the problem), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982); Dayton Bar Ass'n
v. Herzog, 436 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 & n.9 (Ohio 1982) (holding that solicitation letters
sent by attorney to defendants in municipal court cases were not protected by the First
Amendment, and permanently disbarring attorney from the practice of law), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
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filed.' 20 Shapero's letter read:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is true, you may be about to lose your home.
Federal law may allow you to keep your home by ORDERING
your creditor [sic] to STOP and give you more time to pay
them.
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
for FREE information on how you can keep your home.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able
to do for you. Just call and tell me that you got 12this
letter.
1
Remember it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling.
Even though the Commission did not find Shapero's proposed letter
false or misleading, it declined to approve the letter.122 The
Commission based its decision upon a then-existing Kentucky
Supreme Court Rule prohibiting the dissemination of written advertisements "precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or
relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general
public."'123 The Committee on Legal Ethics (the "Committee") of the
Kentucky State Bar Association similarly disapproved of Shapero's
proposed letter, and the Kentucky Bar Association Board of
124
Governors formally adopted the Committee's Advisory Opinion.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Committee's Advisory
Opinion, agreeing that Shapero's letter, because it was a direct, tar120. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 469.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 469-470 (quoting Ky. SuP. CT. RULE 3.135(5)(b)(i) (1988)).
The
Commission did, however, comment that it believed that the rule banning targeted,
direct-mail advertising violated the First Amendment. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470.
Subsequently, the Kentucky Supreme Court replaced Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) with Rule 7.3 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d
299, 300-301 (Ky. 1987). At that time, Rule 7.3 provided:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective
client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship,
by mail, in person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in
person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other
communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters
addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known
to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter,
but who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.
Id. at 301 (quoting Ky. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) (1984)).
Kentucky's adoption of Model Rule 7.3 did not change the status of Shapero's letter,
however, because Model Rule 7.3, like Kentucky's prior rule, prohibited targeted, directmail solicitation. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 471 & n.3.
124. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470.
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geted mailing, inherently had the danger of "overreaching,
intimidat[ing] or misleading" the public, risks that were not present
with general mailings. 125 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
Committee's Advisory Opinion
denying Shapero's request for
26
approval of the proposed letter.

Before the United States Supreme Court, the Kentucky Bar
Association argued that the Court should affirm the Kentucky Supreme
Court's ruling upholding the ban against targeted, direct-mail solicitation because the Shapero case was nothing more than "Ohralik in
writing. '127 Dismissing this argument, the Supreme Court reiterated
two factors that distinguished targeted, direct-mail from the type of inperson solicitation that the Court had permitted states to ban in Ohralik.
First, the Court noted that face-to-face solicitation is "rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue
influence, and outright fraud."' 121 Second, the Court reasoned that
because in-person solicitation is not open to public scrutiny, enforcement of any
regulation short of a complete ban would be
29
impossible.

The Court did not find either of these potential problems to be present in targeted, direct-mail solicitation, but instead concluded that like
print advertising, targeted, direct-mail solicitation "poses much less
risk of overreaching or undue influence" than does in-person solicitation. 3 ° Written communication, in the Court's view, does not involve
"'the coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate' or
the 'pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no
answer."""' With regard to targeted letters, the Court noted that a targeted letter does not "invade the recipient's privacy any more than does
a substantively identical letter mailed at large. "132
Moreover, the Court found that unlike in-person solicitation, targeted, direct-mail solicitation is susceptible to effective regulation.'33
125. Shapero, 726 S.W.2d at 301,
126. Id.
127. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475.
128. Id. at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641).
129. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text for a
more thorough discussion of this principle.
130. Id. at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
131. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642). The Court observed that the nature of written communications is fundamentally different than face-toface encounters, commenting that "[a] letter, like a printed advertisement (but unlike a
lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded."
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475-76.
132. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476.
133. Id.
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States can, for example, require lawyers to file solicitation letters with
the local bar or mandate that each such letter bear a label identifying it
as an advertisement. 134 Therefore, the Court concluded that because
the State could have used means less-restrictive than an outright ban to
regulate Shapero's targeted, direct mailings,
the ban violated
135
Shapero's First Amendment right to free speech.
The Supreme Court also rejected the Kentucky Supreme Court's
conclusion that a ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation was justified
because a particular client could become overwhelmed by his legal
136
troubles and consequently be unable to exercise good judgment.
The Court declared that the state supreme court's analysis was offtarget, noting:
The relevant inquiry is not whether there exist potential clients
whose "condition" makes them susceptible to undue influence,
but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger
that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility ....
In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influ137
ence, the mode of communication makes all the difference.
By the Court's reasoning, targeted, direct-mail solicitation is not a
mode of communication through which lawyers can easily exploit
clients that may be more susceptible to undue influence. 131
Accordingly, the Court held that targeted, direct-mail solicitation by
lawyers, if truthful
and not misleading, is protected by the First
39
Amendment.
Subsequently, many courts have correctly read Shapero to stand for
the principle that all modes of written solicitation enjoy First
Amendment protection, regardless of the recipient's condition or vulnerability, as long as the communication is not false, misleading or
134. Id. at 476-77.
135. Id. at 472, 476.
136. Id. at 474.
137. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474-75 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 475-76; see also supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. The
Kentucky Bar Association further argued that, even if the Court were to extend First
Amendment protection to targeted, direct-mail solicitation, Shapero's letter was overreaching and therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection. Shapero, 486 U.S. at
478. According to the Kentucky Bar Association, two features of Shapero's letter constituted "high pressure solicitation": (1) Shapero's use of underscored, uppercase letters;
and (2) the use of salesman-type language amounting to mere "puffery" (such as
Shapero's assertion to his potential clients, "[iut may surprise you what I may be able to
do for you."). Id. Rejecting the contention that Shapero's letter was overreaching, the
Court concluded that "a truthful and nondeceptive letter, no matter how big its type and
how much it speculates" does not approach the risk of overreaching present in face-toface solicitation. Id. at 479.
139. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479.
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overreaching.'40 In determining whether a given solicitation is constitutionally protected, courts have generally followed the Supreme
Court's directive that it is improper to focus on the condition of the recipient. 141 At least three
42 courts, however, have failed to honor this
mandate.1
constitutional
III.

STATE COURT LIMITS ON SHAPERO

In Shapero, the Supreme Court made it clear that when deciding
whether targeted, direct mailings by attorneys are entitled to constitutional protection, courts are not to consider the susceptibility of the recipient to undue influence. Rather, the Court held that the proper
inquiry is "whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger
that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility."'' 43 Nevertheless, at
least three courts have held that the First Amendment does not protect
targeted, direct-mail solicitation of persons who are unduly vulnerable
because of a recent accident or disaster. Each of these cases is based
upon a misreading of Shapero, and, collectively, they represent a dangerous trend and a serious threat to the constitutional protection
afforded to targeted, direct-mail solicitation.
A.

In re Anis

re Anis,' 44 an

In In
attorney sent a solicitation letter to the family of
a victim of the airplane crash of Pan American Flight 103.145 The letter
140. See, e.g., Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n, 545 A.2d 685,
691 (Md. 1988) (holding that solicitation letters sent by attorney to recently injured
persons, some as soon as the day after the injury, are protected by the First Amendment).
141. See, e.g., id.
142. See infra part III.
143. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474.
144. 599 A.2d 1265 (N.J. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992). The United
States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari should not be read as an implicit approval of
the decision in Anis. See, e.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912,
919 (1949) ("The one thing that can be said with certainty about the court's denial of [a
certiorari petition] is that it does not remotely imply approval or disapproval of what
was said by [the court below].").
145. Anis, 599 A.2d at 1267. The body of the letter provided:
Initially, we would like to extend our deepest sympathy for the loss of your
son, Mr. Alexander Lowenstein. We know that this must be a very traumatic
experience for you, and we hope that you, along with your relatives and
friends, can overcome this catastrophe which has not only affected your
family but has disturbed the world.
As you may already realize, you have a legal cause of action against Pan
American, among others, for wrongful death due to possible negligent security
maintenance. If you intend to take any legal recourse, we urge you to consider
to retain our firm to prosecute your case.
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was sent fourteen days after the disaster, but only one day after the
victim's body was identified. 46 Eight days later, the victim's father,
who had received Anis' letter, filed a complaint against Anis and his
partner with the Office of Attorney Ethics ("OAE"). 147 The OAE's
Committee on Attorney Advertising (the "Committee") charged Anis
with violating Rule 7.3(b)(1) of the New Jersey Rules of Professional
Conduct, which prohibited a lawyer from sending a written communication to a prospective client if he "knows or reasonably should know
that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that
the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a
lawyer." 48 For violating RPC 7.1 (a)(1) and 7.3(b)(1), the Committee
recommended a public reprimand for both attorneys. 49 The State's
Disciplinary Review Board (the "Board"), which reviewed all attorney
disciplinary matters, disagreed with the Committee's conclusion that
Anis had violated RPC 7.3(b)(1). 5 ° The Board reasoned that it was
"debatable" whether Anis could have known that within the hours and
days following a tragic disaster, the victim's family would be particu5 ' Thus, the Board found that Anis had not
larly weak and vulnerable.
52
violated RPC 7.3(b)(1).
Both my partner and myself are experienced practitioners in the personal injury field, and feel that we can obtain a favorable outcome for you against the
airline, among other possible defendants.
We would also like to inform you that if you do decide to retain our services,
you will not be charged for any attorneys fees unless we collect a settlement or
verdict award for you.
Before retaining any other attorney, it would be worth your while to contact
us, since we will substantially reduce the customary one-third fee that most
other attorneys routinely charge.
Please call us to schedule an appointment at your earliest convenience. If
you are unable to come to our office, please so advise us and we will have an
attorney meet you at a location suitable to your needs.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. A complaint was also filed against Anis' partner (who happened to be his
brother). Id. at 1268. The complaint against the partner was dismissed because there
was no evidence that he had been involved in the decision to send the letter. Id.
148. N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RPC 7.3(b)(1) (1984). The OAE also
charged Anis with engaging in false and misleading advertising in violation of RPC
7.1(a)(l). Anis, 599 A.2d at 1268.
149. Anis, 599 A.2d at 1268. Despite its conclusion that Anis should be reprimanded, the Committee noted that in the absence of misleading statements, Anis would
have been protected from disciplinary action by the First Amendment. Id. (citing
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 466).
150. Anis, 599 A.2d at 1268.
151. Id.
152. Anis, 599 A.2d at 1268. The Anis court noted that the Board's determination
that Anis could not be disciplined under RPC 7.3(b)(1) did not stem from any constitu-
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On review of the Board's decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
outlined the constitutional standard set forth in Shapero and concluded
that Anis' conduct fell "within a window left open in Shapero."'53 The
court defined the parameters of that "window" by the "common decency that should attend the usual affairs of mankind.' ' 54 Thus, the
court distinguished the non-intrusive nature of the communication in
Shapero from the facts of Anis.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also concluded that Anis, in violation of Rule 7.3(b)(1), had solicited legal representation at a time when
he knew or should have known that the prospective clients could not
exercise reasonable judgment in employing an attorney. 5 5 According
to the court, Anis' solicitation letter was not entitled to constitutional
protection because it intruded upon the private grief of the victim's
family and took advantage of their vulnerability.1 56 Such a letter, the
court stated, is "patently offensive to the common sensibilities of the
community. ,57
The foundation upon which the Anis court's opinion rests is the
notion that the First Amendment does not protect targeted, direct-mail
solicitation sent to persons who, because of an accident or disaster, are
in a vulnerable condition. 5 8 Indeed, the court went so far as to imtional protection, as the Committee had concluded, but instead was based upon the
Board's conclusion that Anis had not violated the Rule. Id. Although the Board found
that Anis had not violated RPC 7.3(b)(1), it did find that Anis "had engaged in unethical
conduct" and recommended that he receive a public reprimand. Id. at 1268.
153.

Anis, 599 A.2d at 1269. The court stated that "[w]e have no doubt.., that the

commercial speech guarantees of the First Amendment do not protect attorney conduct
that is universally regarded as deplorable and beneath common decency because of its intrusion upon the special vulnerability and private grief of victims or their families." Id.
at 1270.
154. Id. at 1269.
155. Id. at 1270.
156. Anis, 599 A.2d at 1270-71.
157. Id. at 1271. The court repeatedly expressed its belief that solicitation letters
such as Anis' are not entitled to constitutional protection because they are "deplorable"
and "beneath common decency." Id. at 1269, 1270. Not only is this an improper inquiry for assessing whether a direct-mail solicitation is entitled to constitutional
protection, but, additionally, the examples of indecency given by the court were
inapposite. For instance, the court made reference to a report that American lawyers had
rushed to Bhopal, India after the Union Carbide disaster and further noted a report that a
man posing as a priest had solicited victims at the scene of the Northwest Airline crash
in 1987. Id. at 1266. Those incidents are not analogous to Anis' situation because they
involve in-person solicitation rather than targeted, direct-mail solicitation.
158. Anis, 599 A.2d at 1271. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court additionally
affirmed the Committee's finding on the ground that Anis' letter contained false and misleading statements, the court devoted only a very brief portion toward the conclusion of
its opinion to this issue. See id. at 1272. That the court's basis for its decision was
what it perceived as Anis' distasteful attempt to take advantage of vulnerable people is
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pose an implicit ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation within two
weeks of an accident or disaster.1 9 The court's focus on the
vulnerability of potential clients is directly contrary to the Supreme
Court's directive in Shapero.
B. The FloridaBar: Petition to Amend Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues
The Florida Supreme Court has also upheld a partial ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation of accident victims. In The FloridaBar:
Petition to Amend Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising
Issues, 60 the court was asked to approve certain amendments to
Florida's rules regulating attorney advertising. 16' Among the rules that
the Florida Bar Association asked the court to approve was a rule forbidding attorneys from sending targeted, direct-mail solicitation to
62
prospective clients in personal injury and wrongful death cases.
Many objections to the Bar's proposed rules were filed, including
assertions that such a ban was not in accordance with the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Shapero.163 The court declined to
approve an absolute ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation in personal
injury and wrongful death cases, agreeing that a flat ban was inconsistent with Shapero.164 The court reasoned, however, that the State
could constitutionally restrict direct-mail solicitation by requiring a
thirty day post-accident waiting period before any mail advertising
pertaining to personal injury and wrongful death claims could be

evidenced in part by the sheer amount of space that the court devoted to the vulnerable
condition of the letter recipients. See id. at 1269-71.
159. Id. at 1271 ("[W]e shall not impose discipline for truthful letters of solicitation
sent more than two weeks after such a disaster occurs and loss becomes known.").
160. 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
161. Id. at 452.
162. Id. at 454. The version of Rule 4-7.4(b)(l)(a) that the court finally adopted provided:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of himself, his firm, his partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining professional employment if:
(a) The written communication concerns an action for personal injury or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the
person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person,
unless the accident or disaster occurred more than thirty days prior to the mailing of the communication.
Florida Bar, 571 So. 2d at 466.
163. Id. at 456.
164. Id. at 459.
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mailed to victims or survivors. 165
The court based its thirty-day ban on "the sensitized state of the potential clients, who may be either injured or grieving the loss of a
family member."'' 66 Thus, like the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Anis, the Florida Supreme Court approved a partial ban on targeted,
direct-mail solicitation based on the vulnerable condition of certain potential clients. Both opinions are clearly inconsistent with Shapero.167
C. Norris v. Alabama State Bar
Finally, in Norris v. Alabama State Bar,168 the Alabama State Bar
Disciplinary Board suspended attorney Robert Norris from practice for
two years for sending a solicitation letter along with flowers and a
brochure describing his firm to a funeral home where the funeral for a
19 month-old accident victim was to take place. 69 According to
Norris, an anonymous friend of the victim's family had asked him to
send the flowers and brochure to the family. 7 ° Prior to sending the
letter, Norris reviewed the Alabama Disciplinary Rules and concluded
that they did not prohibit this type of communication. 7 ' A complaint
was filed against Norris for violating, inter alia, Alabama Temporary
Disciplinary Rule 2-103, which provided:
165. Id. In addition, the Court approved several restrictions on attorney targeted,
direct-mail solicitation, including, for example, rules requiring that both the letter and
the envelope clearly be marked "advertisement"; that the mailings be filed with the Bar's
Standing Committee on Advertising; that the mailings be sent only by regular U.S.
Mail; and that the mailings conform to certain size restrictions. Id. at 467.
166. Florida Bar, 571 So. 2d at 468.
167. A federal district court recently held that Florida's thirty day ban on targeted,
direct-mail solicitation in personal injury and wrongful death cases is unconstitutional.
McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (M.D. Fla. 1992). Although the
Florida Supreme Court's decision upholding the thirty-day ban is no longer the law in
Florida, the willingness of the Florida Supreme Court, as well as state courts in other
cases, to ignore the United States Supreme Court's directive in Shapero and instead focus
on the recipient's condition, demonstrates a continued and serious threat to the First
Amendment right of attorneys to engage in targeted, direct-mail solicitation.
This conclusion is bolstered by the recent passage of a law in Texas making written
solicitation by attorneys within 30 days of an accident, arrest, or the filing of a lawsuit a
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of one year in prison and a $1,000 fine. A repeat offense, however, constitutes a felony that is punishable by a maximum of 10 years
in prison and a $10,000 fine. See Mark Hansen, Texas Makes Solicitation a Felony,
A.B.A. J.,Sept. 1993, at 32. The Texas legislature's willingness to completely disregard a federal court's ruling and adopt precisely the type of law that the McHenry court
struck down as unconstitutional shows just how little regard some states have for both
federal law and attorneys' First Amendment rights.
168. 582 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 417 (1991).
169. Id. at 1035.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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A lawyer may not solicit nor cause to be solicited on his behalf
professional employment from a prospective client, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.172 The term "solicit" includes contact in person or
by telephone.
Neither Norris nor any of his representatives ever made contact with
the victim's family, either by telephone or in person. 173 Nevertheless,
the court found that Norris had violated DR 2-103.174 The court
reasoned that in-person and telephone contact were merely examples of
the type of conduct that the term "solicit," as it was used in DR 2-103,
was meant to prohibit. 75 Therefore, according to the court, the express reference to only two types of solicitation did not create an exhaustive list of prohibited conduct. 176 Reading DR 2-103 in
conjunction with DR 2-102, the court concluded that although Norris'
act of sending the flowers, letter, and brochure "were actions that a
literal reading of the rule would not prohibit,"'1 77 sending such a com178
munication "clearly violated the purpose and spirit of the rule."'
Thus, in its effort to find that Norris had violated the disciplinary
rules, the court had to go to considerable lengths to read into the rules
a prohibition that they did not expressly include.
The court also rejected Norris' argument that his letter and brochure
were forms of targeted, direct-mail advertisement protected by the First
Amendment. 79 The court stated that Norris' act of sending flowers, a
letter, and a brochure did not constitute an act of sending either direct
mail or even mail at all; rather the court characterized the case as involving "other conduct undertaken in an effort to reach a prospective
client."' 180 Not surprisingly, the court failed to explain the difference
between Norris' letter and targeted, direct-mail solicitation, summarily
concluding that Norris' letter did not fall into the latter category. The
reason for the court's failure to provide such a distinction is simple:

172.

Norris, 582 So. 2d at 1036 (quoting ALA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Temporary DR 2-103 (1986)). Alabama has since replaced Temporary DR 2-103 with
Rule 7.3, which is substantially identical to the former rule. See ALA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7.3 (1990); Norris, 582 So. 2d at 1036 n.3.

173. Norris, 582 So. 2d at 1036.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.

176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 1037.

178.

Norris, 582 So. 2d at 1036.

179. Id.
180.

Id.
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there is no difference between Norris' conduct and that of the attorney
in Shapero.
IV. THE LIMITS PLACED ON TARGETED, DIRECT-MAIL
SOLICITATION IN ANIS, FLORIDA BAR, AND NORRiS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In Shapero, the United States Supreme Court held that the relevant
inquiry into a targeted, direct-mail solicitation is not whether the targeted clients are in a condition which makes them susceptible to undue
influence-as the Anis, and FloridaBar courts held-but whether the
mode of communication used poses a serious risk that lawyers will
exploit such susceptibility.' 8' Employing that test, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that advertising or solicitation in written form, such
as targeted, direct-mail advertising, is constitutionally protected.'82
In upholding bans on targeted, direct-mail solicitation, the courts in
Anis and FloridaBar each focused on the vulnerability of certain types
of prospective clients and concluded that victims of accidents or
disasters are unusually susceptible to possible undue influence through
letters from a trained advocate. The courts disregarded the clear holding of the Supreme Court in Shapero in ruling that this susceptibility
warranted a partial ban on direct mailings. Norris further added to this
alarming tendency of state courts to obviate the protection that Shapero
gave to written communications from attorneys to potential clients.
Opponents of First Amendment protection for targeted mailings argue that Shapero is distinguishable from Anis, FloridaBar, and Norris
for two reasons. First, as a federal district court in Florida noted, the
restrictions placed on direct-mail solicitation in cases such as Florida
Bar are limited, unlike the absolute prohibitions stricken by the
Supreme Court in Shapero.'83 As support for the argument that these
limited restrictions are permissible, opponents rely on a footnote in
Peel v. Attorney Registration & DisciplinaryComm n, 184 which states:
"[T]hat a total ban [on advertising] is unconstitutional does not
necessarily preclude less restrictive regulation of commercial
speech."' 85
181. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474.
182. See Shapero and In re R.M.J., discussed supra notes 76-80, 120-41 and
accompanying text.
183. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1546-47 (M.D. Fla. 1992)
(discussing opponents' attempts to distinguish FloridaBar from Shapero).

184. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
185. Id. at 110 n.17. The Florida Bar Association raised this argument before the
federal district court in Florida in support of its position that the State's newly adopted
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As the Florida district court in McHenry pointed out, however, there
is a flaw in this contention: The language in the Peel footnote appears
in the context of the Court's discussion of disclosure requirements and
the screening of advertisements to "ensure that the information is presented in a nonmisleading [sic] manner.' ' 86 The Florida Bar's regulations, in contrast, addressed only the timing of the communication.' 87
Thus, the district court reasoned that Peel does not support restrictions
such as that sought by the Florida Bar because a delay in sending targeted, direct-mail solicitation to accident victims will not affect whether
88
the letter is misleading any more than if the ban were not in effect.
Opponents of extending First Amendment protection to direct-mail
solicitations have also attempted to limit the application of Shapero on
the ground that it did not involve solicitation in a personal injury or
wrongful death case. In Anis, for example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court discounted Shapero by noting that it involved direct-mail solicitation of parties facing foreclosure rather than accident victims or their
families.189 Solicitation in a foreclosure case such as Shapero,
reasoned the Anis court, involved "none of the factors that concern us
here."' 9 A careful reading of Shapero, however, reveals that the Anis
court's reading of Shapero as being inapplicable to personal injury
cases is mistaken.
In Shapero, the Supreme Court cited with approval' 9' In re Von
Wiegen, 92 a case in which the New York Court of Appeals held that
an attorney's targeted direct-mail solicitation of the victims of a disaster
was protected by the First Amendment. 93 If the Supreme Court had
not intended to extend First Amendment protection to targeted mailings
in personal injury and wrongful death cases, it certainly would not
have held that the condition of the recipient is not the proper focus of a
court's inquiry, and it most likely would not have cited Von Wiegen.

restrictions on attorneys' direct-mail solicitations passed constitutional muster. See
McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1546-47.
186. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1547 (quoting Peel, 496 U.S. at Ill (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
187. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1546.
188. Id. at 1546-47.
189. Anis, 599 A.2d at 1269.
190. Id.
191. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479.
192. 470 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985).
193. Von Wiegen, 470 N.E.2d at 843. See also supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of Von Wiegen.
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CONCLUSION

In Shapero, the United States Supreme Court made clear that in
cases assessing whether attorneys' targeted, direct-mail solicitations
are entitled to constitutional protection, courts are not to ask whether
an attorney has sent communications to potential clients "whose
'condition' makes them susceptible to undue influence."' 9 4 Instead, in
passing judgment on whether a communication is protected by the
First Amendment, courts must inquire "whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such
susceptibility.' 95 Employing this test, the Court has declared that
written forms of communication such as targeted, direct-mail solicitation are protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, several state
courts have circumvented Shapero by permitting states to ban certain
forms of written solicitation, concluding, in total disregard of Shapero,
that the First Amendment does not protect targeted, direct-mail solicitation sent to persons who are unduly vulnerable because of a recent
accident or disaster.
Over the last two years, state courts have begun to erode the protection afforded targeted, direct-mail solicitation in Shapero. Moreover,
with the passage of the Texas law making targeted, direct-mail solicitation by attorneys a felony, it appears as though state legislatures are
now willing to follow these courts' lead in infringing on attorneys'
free speech rights.' 96 Most troubling is that opponents of First
Amendment protection of targeted, direct-mail solicitation are beginning to distinguish Shapero by using these cases in an effort to quash
so-called "distasteful" conduct. The time is ripe to stop this erosion
and to effectuate the guarantees of the First Amendment, starting with
a refusal by other courts to follow Anis, FloridaBar, and Norris.

194. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 15, 167.

